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Summary 
Privatization is one of the major economic reforms in all transition economies. Essentially, it 
is aimed at increasing overall economic performance. Prior to 1996, privatization in Belarus 
followed the pattern observed in Central and East European and the CIS countries. 
However, by 1998 Belarus opted for a state-controlled economy and enhancement of public 
sector performance. As for the private sector, it has been given a role only at niche and 
specialized markets (not to compete with state-owned companies). The need for 
privatization has finally evaporated by 2005. However, changes in the terms of trade with 
Russia revealed some sensitivity of the Belarusian economic model to external shocks so 
new systemic risks and challenges have become more apparent. As a result, in 2007, some 
notable privatization deals were completed. After an agreement of gradual price increase is 
reached, the need for sale of state-owned enterprises is diminished. Also, subsidies to the 
real economy and the population could be maintained. As a result, there is moneyed, 
nontransparent privatization. The State Property Committee has no real influence upon 
privatization decision-making, including the ways of privatization, its beneficiaries or 
participants. 
                                                 
* BISS kindly acknowledges assistance by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovak Republic and 
SlovakAid in preparing this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
Privatization is the most important and at the same time the most complicated reform 
across all post-socialist countries. Initially, privatization was seen as a way towards 
achievement of many, sometimes contradictory, goals transition economies had been 
facing. On the one hand, the outcomes of privatization could to a large extent explained by 
priority choice made by politicians. Policy options range from social equity to maximization 
of fiscal revenues and to efficiency increase of privatized companies. At the same time, the 
choice of the method of privatization along with transparency and openness strongly matter 
and even determine the efficiency of privatization efforts. On the other hand, goals 
selections determine the choice over methods, speed, and sequence of privatization. While 
Central and East European (CEE) countries opted for accomplishing economic goals (like 
efficiency increase and enhancement of competitiveness and enterprise performance) by 
using direct sales and attraction of FDI, many of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) countries attempted to reach mainly political and social targets. For that purpose, 
workers’ buyout and mass privatization were often used. 
As for Belarus, it is a laggard in the implementation of major transition economy’s reforms. 
In contrast to CEE countries, privatization has not been seen as a necessary reform by the 
Belarusian government and economic elites. Consequently, privatization, especially so-
called ‘large-scale privatization’, has not been implemented in the country for rather long 
period of time. Currently it is only 30% of enterprises are privatized (although it is more 
correct to say ‘turned into joint-stock companies’ or ‘incorporated’ since often the 
government remains the major shareholder). Nevertheless, the situation over 2007 slightly 
changed. In particular, several notable deals were made so there is a surge of interest to 
privatization and its potential for Belarus. 
The paper is organized as follows. The second section discusses legislative framework and 
the limits to privatization in Belarus. The third section analyzes the dynamics and direction 
of privatization in the country. The fourth section attempts to draw a stakeholders’ map of 
Belarusian privatization so the contours of the past and also of the future privatization could 
be made. The final section concludes. 
2. Legislative framework 
The early history of Belarusian privatization is similar to the one of the majority of the post-
Soviet countries. In 1991, the Council of Ministers of Belarus began to mould the legislative 
basis for the transformation of the state property1. On that basis, 19 national companies 
and 42 municipal companies were either incorporated or bought out in 1991. A year later, a 
separate Committee for State Property Management has been set up in order to conduct 
and control over privatization deals. 2 The new laws of 19933 changed the legislative basis 
of privatization so it was provided with an impetus for further development. In particular, 
the State Program of 1993 suggested privatization of about two-thirds of state-owned 
companies by 1999 (state was decided to own infrastructural facilities) like in many of CEE 
and CIS countries at that time.4 Personalized privatization coupons (called ‘Property’) or 
vouchers have been introduced to buy out shares of the state property. Initially, Belarus 
                                                 
1 Regulation of the Council of Ministers of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic adopted on 
September 23, 1991 ‘On Denationalization of Economy and Privatization of State Property of the 
Republic of Belarus’ and some other legislative acts. 
2 In 1993, it was transformed into the State Committee of the Republic of Belarus for State Property 
Management and Privatization; in 1994 – into the Ministry of State Property Management and 
Privatization; in 2002, the Ministry was reorganized into the Property Fund under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Economy of the Republic of Belarus. Finally, in 2006, the Fund was reorganized again to 
become the State Property Committee. Now it incorporates the Fund for State Property and the 
Committee for Land, Geodesy, and Cartography under the auspices of the Council of Ministers. At the 
same time, there is a new department established in the Ministry of Economy to develop policies 
towards property relations and privatization strategy. 
3 ‘On Denationalization and Privatization of State Property in the Republic of Belarus’ and ‘On 
Personalized Coupons’. 
4 Besides that, there was a list of enterprises and organizations and property facilities that shall not be 
privatized and a list of companies whose denationalization and privatization require a special 
permission of the Council of Ministers. Later, these lists were expanding only. 
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opted for mass coupon privatization following the experience of many other transition 
countries. However, this intention remains to be very much unrealized. Currently Belarus is 
the only country across the former socialist bloc where coupon privatization is not yet 
completed. 5
In December 1995, the Program for Denationalization and Privatization for 1996 was 
adopted by the President of Belarus. This Program stipulated the transformation of state-
owned companies into open joint-stock companies. The transformation could have been 
triggered not only by employees (i.e. ‘from below’), but also by government agencies 
dealing with privatization and branch ministries (i.e. ‘privatization from above’). 6 However, 
the 1996 Program had not been implemented. Over the period of 1995–1997, annual 
privatization programs and lists of enterprises available for privatization had not been even 
adopted. Accordingly, privatization was taking place only at those companies that jumped 
into the train in the early years of transition. Prior to 1997, a final say for the adoption of 
annual privatization programs was granted to the Council of Ministers, but since 1997 this 
role was taken by the President. 
In 1998, the President’s Edict has stopped the practice of development and adoption of 
annual denationalization and privatization programs. 7 Since that, the legislative framework 
for management of state property has not been amended substantially. The Concept of 
Management of State Property in the Republic of Belarus over 2001–2005 (adopted in 
2001) is merely preserved the status quo. As a result, privatization was crowded out by 
formal incorporation, while legislation regulating the implementation of ‘golden share’ rule, 
bankruptcy, etc. was changed for a worse, while intentions of nationalization became 
apparent than. 
Over 2002–2003, a number of large state-owned companies of petrochemical sector and 
‘Beltransgaz’ (a supplier of natural gas in Belarus) has been turned into joint-stock 
companies. Although these companies required at least USD 1 billion to launch investment 
projects, economic security considerations prevailed. 8 The state remained to be the single 
owner of these enterprises (by possessing 100% stock of shares). Some Russian companies 
took part at the auctions organized to sell holding of stock of some Belarusian enterprises 
(including petrochemical and metallurgical ones and breweries). However, Russians soon 
refused from participation by considering the terms and conditions set by the Belarusian 
authorities too stringent. In particular, shares appeared to be overpriced, no possibility for 
buying out of control stock existed, employment was not allowed to cut, and, finally, some 
obligations to invest into ‘social infrastructure’ were established. However, acquiring of 
control stock did not translate into the full-scale controls over company. The government of 
Belarus possesses numerous mechanisms of intervention into company’s decisions, ranging 
from price setting to investment and personnel policies. 
In 2002, the Ministry for State Property was transformed into the Fund for State Property 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Economy. The Fund had been granted with minimum 
degree of authority (while privatization was virtually stopped in the country, and only 30% 
of the former state-run companies were turned into joint-stock ones). At the same time, the 
role of Presidential Administration was strengthened. In particular, decisions about sale of 
any piece of property valued more than USD 80 thousand is made personally by the 
President. In fact, 2002 can be marked as the end of the formal privatization period in 
Belarus. 
                                                 
5 50% of state property was supposed to transfer to individuals in exchange for coupons. In addition, 
employees of privatizing enterprises were provided with preferences in case of buyouts. However, by 
2008, only a half of the coupons had been utilized. Voucher privatization was extended five times. A 
separate paper on voucher privatization is to be prepared within the framework of the project. 
6 Available at: 
http://w3.main.gov.by/ministry/economy.nsf/0/7396ab84092c090cc22570e30022390e?OpenDocume
nt&Click= 
7 Decree No. 3 of the President of Belarus adopted on March 20, 1998 ‘On Denationalization and 
Privatization of State Property in the Republic of Belarus’. 
8 Available at: 
http://w3.main.gov.by/ministry/economy.nsf/0/7396ab84092c090cc22570e30022390e?OpenDocume
nt&Click= 
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Still, the government routinely adopts annual denationalization and privatization programs 
on the annual basis. In fact, these programs reflect the intention to incorporate some 
companies. The latter’s quantity is decreasing every year. 
3. Directions and dynamics of Belarusian privatization 
3.1. The methods and outcomes of privatization 
Prior to 1995, denationalization and privatization have been initiated by employees, legal 
entities and even individuals by applying for permission to government agencies. Employees 
or ‘labor collectives’ were given a priority over other actors. In general, since 1995 onwards 
privatization is occurred after the permission of government agencies is secured. The 
government has developed a comprehensive privatization program to incorporate medium 
and large-scale companies of industry, construction, and transport. For auction sales, 
companies owned by municipalities were offered, including trade and catering and services 
companies) along with unfinished/suspended construction. 
Since 1996 privatization had been slowed down rather substantially due to the changed 
government’s attitude towards privatization and overall intention to establish controls over 
material and financial flows. For instance, in 2007, the State Property Committee (SPC) 
turned only 4 national companies into joint-stock ones (the same number was observed in 
2006; see fig. 1 for more information). 
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Fig. 1: Dynamics of denationalization in Belarus,  
1991–2007 (national and municipal property) 
Source: The Ministry of Economy. 
By January 1, 2008 as many as 7,101 entities previously fully owned by the state have been 
transformed in either way (2,024 were owned by central bodies, while 6,884 were owned by 
municipal authorities). As for the branch specifics, 40% of enterprises in the industry were 
reformed, while 45% and 32% in the agricultural and construction sector, respectively. 
Trade, catering, services, woodworking, and agricultural production are the leading sectors 
in terms of enterprise reform (about 70% of companies were transformed; see the tables 
1–2 in the Appendix). 
It appears that by the beginning of 2008, even small-scale privatization in Belarus is not 
completed (about 80% of companies are privatized), while only 40% of medium- and large-
scale companies have changed their ownership status. At the same time, it is only industrial 
enterprises, trade and service sector companies are incorporated more often. Transports, 
construction, and public utilities continue to be controlled and owned by the state. 
As for the methods of privatization, the following ones have been applied in Belarus: 
incorporation/turning of companies into joint-stock ones; buyout of leasehold by 
leaseholder; employee buyout; bid sale; auction sale. 
However, the methods have certain specifics. For instance, over 1991–1992, leaseholder’s 
buyouts were quite popular (along with employee buyout). Since 1996 onwards 
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incorporation has become the only method of privatization utilized in Belarus. Over 1991–
2006, 906 open joint-stock companies were registered in Belarus (83% of the total number 
of transformed enterprises; see table 2 for details). The state has not owned any fraction of 
stock of companies established over 1991–1992. But the situation has changed. Now there 
is a tendency for ever growing share of the state in joint stock of companies. At the same 
time, government bodies are often reluctant to sell property holdings, so only tiny fraction 
of shares is offered for purchase. 
Table 2: Dynamics of property transformation and the methods of privatization 
Number of entities  
1991-2004 2005 2006 Всего 
Denationalization     
Leaseholder buyout 135 0 0 135 
Employee buyout 25 0 0 25 
Individual buyout 1 0 0 1 
Incorporation 875 27 4 906 
Bid 17 0 0 17 
Auction 8 0 0 8 
Alienation     
Sale to a certain customer (gratuitous assignment) 1 1 1 3 
Sale to a specific customer 242 9 10 261 
Auction 323 72 55 450 
Auction (gratuitous assignment) 1 2 3 6 
Auction (reduction of initial price) 2 6 1 9 
Auction (reduction of initial price, gratuitous 
assignment) 
0 1 0 1 
Bid 157 1 2 160 
Gratuitous assignment 24 0 0 24 
Exchange/swap 6 0 0 6 
Total of the above 
(denationalization/alienation) 
1061/756 27/92 4/72 1092/920 
Source: State Property Committee. 
By January 1, 2008, the government holds its share in 640 joint-stock companies (68% of 
the total number of companies). The structure of joint stock across the economy is as 
follows: 
− Privately owned (no state share) – 32% (299 joint-stock companies); 
− Less then 25% of shares are owned by the state – 8% (77 joint-stock companies); 
− State owns from 25% to 50% of shares – 13% (120 joint-stock companies); 
− State owns from 50% to 75% of – 7% (71 joint-stock companies); 
− More then 75% of shares are owned by the state – 40% (372 joint-stock companies). 
In fact, nearly all equity issued by Belarusian joint-stock companies is either owned by the 
state or individuals who acquired the stock by using coupons or purchasing at preference 
prices. At the same time, equity issued in exchange of coupons or purchased at preference 
prices are not allowed to circulate freely. As a result, raising equity capital is not an option 
for the majority of joint-stock companies. Instead, they have to rely on own funds or the 
budget since equity market is severely underdeveloped. This imposes serious restrictions on 
enterprise development in Belarus. 
Buyouts, bids, and auctions allow external owners to acquire company ownership. A mere 
incorporation while 100% of stock is owned by the state is not privatization per se. In 
Belarus, privatization is not even about selling assets to bureaucratic establishment or 
insiders, but about the preservation of state property of (and therefore controls over) the 
economy. 
In addition, the fiscal effects of privatization have not been considered in Belarus. Over a 
number of years, privatization revenues amounted to less than 1% of the budget revenues, 
while targets to increase this figure were missed on a systematic basis (the Ministry of 
Finance usually collected only 2–3% of the revenues planned!). In 2005, it was eventually 
recognized by the government so the planned privatization revenues had been reduced 
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from BYR 100 billion to BYR 2 billion. In 2006, privatization revenues amounted to just BYR 
1.2 billion (USD 0.56 million). Even more, these revenues were acquired primarily as share 
dividends or lease incomes, and not from the sale of equity or company stock. Accordingly, 
the budget is provided with revenues from the use of state property and sale of some 
illiquid property stock. Over 2005–2006, equity sales allowed to acquire BYR 625.5 million 
only, while the use of state property provided as much as BYR 396.9 billion in 2005 alone. 
In 2007, both the use and sale of state property yielded BYR 649.7 billion (USD 303 
million). 
Unused property has not been brought into privatization process. Now there are about 
13,000 unused property facilities, while a year ago there were 11,000 of them. In 2007, 
about 3,100 unused property facilities were planned to draw into economic activity via 
‘gratuitous assignment’. But in practice alienation procedure was used for 1,400 facilities 
only. As for the auctions, 248 facilities were offered for sale at a very symbolic price of BYR 
35,000 (or about USD 16) each, while only 80 of them were actually sold. The Committee’s 
representatives blame the lack of zeal of ‘agents responsible’ and lengthy administrative 
procedures required to establish agreement among government agents. 
3.2. Peculiar feature of Belarusian privatization 
Golden share 
In 1997, the government has introduced a specific policy tool entitled ‘golden share’ in 
addition to the existing mechanisms of administratively-controlled (case-by-case) 
privatization.9 In 2004, the opportunities to introduce ‘golden share’ rule had been 
broadened. Formally, the government was given a right to use this rule at any privatized 
company, in case of negative financial performance or wages are not paid over the last 
three months. 10 It is not only controls over enterprise, but also appointment of company 
management is permitted. In 2005, golden share was introduced at a private company. 11
By March 2008, ‘golden share’ was introduced at 10 joint-stock companies. In general, this 
was established at 23 joint-stock companies for a period from 1 to 5 years. However, any 
foreign experts noted that the very existence of this rule seriously deteriorates the quality 
of domestic business climate and the possibility of attraction of foreign direct investment. 
However, in March 2008, ‘golden share’ was eventually abolished. 12
Privatization and nationalization 
In 2005, the tendency for nationalization has become to resurface. Equity was exchange for 
debts accumulated by joint-stock companies. In 2006, provision of state aid or preferences 
(tax breaks, energy prices, customs duties, loans, etc.) has been conditioned upon the 
return of 100% of equity to the hands of the state. As a result, the share of the state has 
increased in a number of joint-stock companies, while some of them have become fully 
owned by the state. 13
 
                                                 
9 Decree of the President of Belarus No. 591 adopted on November 14, 1997. 
10 Decree of the President of Belarus No. 125 adopted on March 1, 2004 'On Special Right (‘Golden 
Share’) of the State for Participation in Management of Economic Units’. 
11 Gomel Executive Committee has introduced a golden share rule at a private company ‘MNPZ plus’. 
This company owned 12.25% of shares of Mozyr refinery. As a result, the state acquired a controlling 
stock (increasing its share from 42.76% to 55%). Many experts treated that as a violation of existing 
legislation by the government since golden share could be introduced at privatized companies only 
(while ‘MNPZ plus’ was a private company, and not a privatized one). However, courts of various 
jurisdictions have left this decision in force. 
12 Decree of the President of Belarus No. 144 adopted on March 14, 2008. 
13 In particular, this scheme was adopted at the following companies: ‘Minsk Bearing Plant’ JSC (state 
share was increased from 69.98% to 100%), ‘Belsolod’ (from 57.6% to 88%), ‘Gomel Fat Products 
Plants (to 99.7%), ‘Homiel Construction Materials’ (from 81.3% to 97.5%), ‘Gorodeya Sugar Plant’ (to 
99.9%), ‘Zhabinka Sugar Plant’ (from 97.4 to 98.9%), ‘Rogachev Milk and Cannery Plant’ (to 
51.52%), ‘Navahrudak Buttery-Making Plant’ (from 87.8% to 97.6%), ‘Neman Glass Works’ (from 
94.32% to 100%). Also, state share was increased at ‘Krasnoselsk Construction Materials’ company 
and ‘Kalinkovichi Repair and Engineering Works’. 
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3.3. Privatization in 2007 
In 2007, the economy of Belarus faced the energy shock. In particular, twofold gas price 
increase occurred, while a 30% customs duty on oil was introduced following the demand of 
the Russian government. As a result, profitability of oil processing was adversely affected 
given that 40% of Belarusian exports fall on processed oil. 14 Many government and 
independent experts forecasted an economic crisis stemming from the inability of 
companies to cover increased energy costs and the lack of funds to finance government 
expenditures. Consequently, the government has started to seek additional financial 
resources. Apart from mounting foreign debt, privatization theme has become relatively 
important as a source of budget revenues. In fact, a list of enterprises available for sale has 
been prepared. 15 The list incorporated many liquid, relatively well-performing and strategic 
enterprises, including ‘Natfan’ JSC, ‘Mozyr refinery’, Minsk Automobile Plant, Belarusian 
Cement Plant, ‘Polymir’ JSC, Svetlahorsk-based ‘Himvolokno’, ‘Beltelekom’, Hrodna-based 
tobacco factory ‘Neman’, ‘Belshina’ JSC, ‘Grodno-Azot’ JSC, Grodno-based ‘Khimvolokno’, 
and ‘Mahileuhimvolokno’ JSC. However, not a single deal has been completed do far. 
Incorporation 
In 2007, three companies were planned to turn into joint-stock companies considered 
strategic by the government. These are national unitary enterprise ‘Belarusian Cement 
Plant’ (1,070 employees), ‘Krichevcementoshifer’ (a Krichev-based plant producing cement 
and slate employing 1,669 people), and ‘Grodno Tobacco Factory’ (1,166 employees). Of 
them, only the latter company was turned into joint-stock company. Possibly, incorporation 
is the first step towards privatization of these companies in the future. Besides that, 
‘Oranchicy Poultry Factory’ (located in Pruszany district of the Brest region and employing 
125 people), ‘Design Office of System Software Development’ (Gomel City, 176 employees), 
and ‘Aircraft Repair Plant’ (located in Baranovichi, 1,500 employees). 
Privatization 
In 2007, several notable privatization deals were completed involving real sector 
companies, infrastructure, and banks.16 The majority of deals was completed in a cloaked 
fashion, i.e. there were no transparency and open bids. Instead, behind-the-scenes and 
insider agreements were preferred. For instance, state’s share in the statutory fund of the 
leading telecom company ‘Velcom’ was sold for USD 556 million.17 ‘Gazprom’ paid 12.5% of 
‘Belransgaz’ equity for USD 625 million. 18 ‘Motovelo’ JSC (99.7% of equity) has been 
purchased by Austrian company ATEC Holding GmbH for approximately USD 7.2 million. In 
December 2007, President Lukashenka signed a decree permitting the sale of shares of the 
Belarusian Company ‘Gastello’s Experimental Plant’ to ‘Amkodor’ JSC. 
In the financial sector, some deals have been made. In 2007, Russian banks either 
purchased or planned to purchase holding of stock of some Belarusian banks, including 
‘Slavnefebank’ (USD 25 million), ‘Belvneshekonombank’ (USD 24 million), and ‘Belrosbank’. 
All these deals were closed for the public. A number of banks issued additional shares (like 
VTB, ‘Belgazprombank’, etc.). 
Outcomes 
                                                 
14 See analytical papers prepared by the IPM Research Center: Chubrik, A. and Kruk, D. Scenarii 
razvitija ekonomiki Belarusi posle energeticheskogo shoka: prognoz na osnove 
makroekonometricheskoj modeli [Scenarios of Development of the Economy of Belarus after the 
Energy Shock: A Forecast Based on the Macroeconometric Model], Working Paper of the IPM Research 
Center WP/08/01, available at http://research.by/pdf/wp2008r01.pdf and Rakova, E., Tochitskaya, I., 
and Shymanovich, G. ‘Rost Cen na Gaz: Novye Vyzovy Dlya Belorusskoi Ekonomiki’ [‘Gas Price 
Increase: New Challenges for the Belarusian Economy’], available at: 
http://research.by/pdf/wp2007r03.pdf. 
15 Despite that coupon privatization has been formally continued, President Lukashenka said that all 
profitable companies would only be sold to foreign investors at the highest possible price. 
16 These deals are to be analyzed further. 
17 In October 2007, Cyprus-based mobile phone operator, SB-Telecom sold holding of stock of 
Belarusian company ‘Velcom’ (51%) to Telecom Austria at EUR 535 million. 
18 According to Belarus-Russia agreements, ‘Gazprom’ would annually purchase 12.5% of holding of 
‘Beltransgaz’ stock at USD 625 million until 2011 (or 50% of shares at USD 2.5 billion). 
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In general, the sale of state-owned holding of share resulted in USD 1.2 billion and more 
than BYR 6 billion (USD 2.8 million) of budget revenues. The use and sale of property 
owned by the central authorities allowed to collect BYR 649.7 billion (or about USD 305 
million). 
At the same time, many ‘strategic’ companies has been neither incorporated nor privatized. 
For instance, at the beginning of 2007, the government of Belarus was preparing to sell 
cement plans (while several foreign investors were interested in conducting investment). 
However, after some time, the decision has been made to develop cement and construction 
sectors by using domestic resources (like in the case of beer-producing industry19), i.e. by 
using state funds. In similar fashion, the authorities refused to sell ‘Spartak’ JSC 
(confectionery producer) to Russian investors.20 Also, the decision to sell controlling stock of 
‘Integral’ (Electronics Company) to ‘Sistema’ company from Russia was delayed. 
Privatization of petrochemical companies is not even discussed. 
4. Privatization in Belarus: stakeholders’ profile 
The content of every privatization process is determined by stakeholders involved either 
directly or indirectly (table 2). In addition, there are factors like domestic political and 
economic situation. In Belarus, the specific feature is that many of the stakeholders can 
only exert an informal impact upon privatization process since important decisions are made 
by Presidential Administration. As a result, neither the Ministry of Economy nor the Ministry 
of Finance is responsible for decision-making about the selection of companies, 
determination of their bid value, etc. Also, enterprise managers are not free to choose 
investors and terms and conditions of their participation. As a result, the efficiency of 
privatization decisions are drastically reduced so Belarusian privatization turns to be 
bureaucracy-based, non-transparent, and, possibly, corrupt. 
This situation can only be altered by serious shocks of either economic (like worsening of 
economic situation, enterprise losses and bankruptcies, the need for foreign investment, 
etc.) or political nature (changes in decision-making, opportunities for Belarusian business 
or bureaucratic elites to legalize capital accumulated in the earl years of transition). 
Table 2: Privatization and stakeholders in Belarus 
Actors Involvement Current 
impact 
Factors determining 
attitude change and 
balance of forces 
The 
government 
of Belarus 
(Council of 
Ministers, 
Ministry of 
Economy, 
Ministry of 
Finance 
 
 
Growth of efficiency, better enterprise 
performance 
Minimal Deterioration of 
economic situation, 
growing demand for 
state support, 
(resulting in) 
budget deficit 
State 
Property 
Committee 
Conduct of efficient privatization Minimal Worsening of 
enterprise 
performance, 
inability to provide 
                                                 
19 In 2006, President Lukashenka approved this deal along with the attraction of foreign investment 
into bear-producing industry. Following this, five major companies, such as Heineken, Baltic 
Beverages Holding AB (BBH), investment group Detroit Investment Ltd (founder of ‘Syabar’ brewery 
in Belarus), SUB Miller and Groupe Soufflet submitted investment proposals, while expecting 
privatization of Belarusian ‘Krynitsa’, ‘Brest Beer’, and ‘Belsolod’. However, in August 2007, President 
Lukashenka said no to privatization of Belarusian breweries. He claimed that loans could be utilized to 
modernize these companies, and to sell them at higher prices several years later. 
20 Chairman of ‘Belgospisheprom’ concert I.Danchanka, said that ‘Russians want to purchase ‘Spartak’. 
But it is our national pride, national brand, so we are not in the hurry to sell it to investor’. 
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state investment 
Presidential 
Administrati
on 
Preservation (as much as it is only 
possible) of state ownership of and 
controls over the financial (and trade) 
flows in the country 
Decisive Economic crisis, the 
need for funds to 
cover the 
merchandize trade 
deficit and to 
subsidize state-
owned companies 
Enterprises Preservation of state support, acquiring 
of the maximum share of holding of 
stock, the search for efficient investors, 
investment and modernization 
Insignifican
t 
Worsening of 
economic situation 
Investors In the majority of cases, investors are 
distracted to participate due to 
unfavorable business climate conditions 
and certain specific requirements set by 
the authorities, including preservation of 
employment and enterprise’s 
specialization and output profile, 
provision of social facilities, etc. 
At the same time, investors seek to 
establish full controls over company 
(50% of shares plus one) at the lowest 
possible price with minimum of 
obligations 
Depends on 
the deal: 
varies from 
minimal to 
significant 
Changes in the 
investment climate; 
changes of the 
authorities’ attitude 
towards 
privatization 
 
5. Conclusion 
In Belarus, privatization is one of the least implemented reforms. In 1995, mass 
privatization had been nearly stopped. Now privatization is turned into closed and ‘case-by-
case’ process. In fact, it is substituted by incorporation, while the state continues to own 
holding of stock in many companies turned into joint-stock ones. At the same time, the 
government retains many levers of influence on enterprise functioning and performance. 
Legislation is often applied in a selective matter. The majority of crucial decisions are made 
by the Presidential Administration, and not the State Property Committee (under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Economy). 
As a result, Belarus remains to be privatization laggard across the CIS countries both in 
terms of small-scale and large-scale privatization. The EBRD (EBRD (2007)) notes that only 
20% of Belarus’ GDP is produced by private companies, while the share of small and 
medium-sized companies in GDP is about 10%. The system of state provision and 
subsidization is functioning in such a way that it is more advantageous to be a state-owned 
than a privatized enterprise. 
Nevertheless, the Belarusian authorities are confronted with the need of enterprise 
restructuring and improvement of their performance and profitability. Also, the importance 
of foreign direct investment is properly understood. However, FDI attraction is merely 
connected not to real policies, but intentions and plans to somehow improve the domestic 
business environment instead of privatization by or sale of Belarusian companies to foreign 
investors. 
The analysis of the situation suggests that over 2008 privatization remains to be closed and 
case-by-case. There is no need to attract additional financial resources to the Belarusian 
economy, especially when gas price increase has been substantially moderated. The existing 
practice of decision-making (i.e. Presidential Administration plays the key role) allows the 
suggestion that some deals could take place. But in any case, no large-scale privatization 
should be expected. ‘Family jewels’ would also be untouched (like petrochemical, 
metallurgical, or machine-building companies). At the same time, some media mentioned 
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the possibility of selling 2% of share of ‘MTS’ company21 (telecom company, a joint Russian-
Belarusian venture), and the sale of controlling stock of the third mobile phone operator, 
‘Best’. In addition, it is very likely that Russian and other foreign banks would purchases 
shares in their Belarusian counterparts. As for other deals, these are rather hypothetical and 
closed by their nature. 
                                                 
21 Russian company has 49%, but plans to acquire controlling stock. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: The dynamics of privatization across regions 
Number of facilities transformed/alienated  
1991-2004 2005 2006 
Total number of 
facilities 
transformed/alie
nated 
Total 
Minsk 270/156 9/40 2/10 281/206 487 
Brest region 116/107 7/5 1/6 124/118 242 
Vitebsk region 124/70 5/5 0/8 129/83 212 
Gomel region 120/117 1/16 0/15 121/148 269 
Grodno region 106/67 3/10 0/7 109/84 193 
Minsk region 188/168 0/12 1/23 188/203 392 
Mogilev region 137/71 2/4 0/3 139/78 217 
Total 1061/756 27/92 4/72 1092/920 2012 
Source: State Property Committee 
Table 2: Dynamics of privatization across industries and sectors 
Number of facili
transformed/aliena
ties 
ted 
 
1991-2004 2005 00
f 
s 
 
2 6 
Total number o
facilitie
transformed/ali
enated
Total 
Industry 376/169 /15 1/16 0 7 384/20 584 
Agricultural companie
(except s
s 
tate-owned farms)  
177/36 2/1 1/1 180/38 218 
21 0/0 0/0 1 
91 3/5 1/0 6 
76 11 /24 1 
22 8/2 0/2 6 
/8 0/0 0/0 8 
/1 1/1 0/0 2 
5 0/0 0/0 5 
13 0/0 0/2 5 
/2 0/1 0/2 5 
/4 0/0 0/1 5 
/2 0/0 0/0 2 
0/1 8 
04 31 8 
5
State-owned farms 1/ 1/2 22 
Construction 233/ 237/9 333 
Transports and 
communication 
73/ 2/ 0 75/11 186 
Trade 61/ 69/2 96 
Catering 5 5/ 13 
Services 39 40/ 42 
Public utilities 3/ 3/ 8 
Healthcare 2/ 2/1 17 
Education 0 0/ 5 
Culture 1 1/ 6 
Sports 2 2/ 4 
Property of government 
agencies 
0/2 0/25 0/2 28 
Other sectors 88/3 4/ 1/23 93/35 451 
Total 1061/7 6 27/92 4/72 0 1092/92 2012 
Source: State property committee 
